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Abstract 
If we consider business forms from the point of view of satisfying needs, public companies are consumer 
companies that satisfy collective needs with the aim of redistributing income. They differ from production 
companies in that they do not have direct access to the market, so that the sources of financing derive from the 
taxes imposed by law, while the uses concern management costs, capital investments and debt repayments. 
Maintaining this interpretation, another category belonging to consumer companies is that of non-profit 
companies, which can be equated partially to public companies precisely because of the absence of a real market 
of reference and the finding of sources of funding for the performance of the activity mainly from external 
contributions without consideration. The only difference is inherent in the fact that such contributions cannot be 
imposed by law and are aimed at assisting and providing services and benefits to the community of reference, in 
the absence of profit and capital distribution. Therefore, if in the public sector performance is mainly and 
historically linked to the management of financial resources and public debt, in the field of nonprofit there is a 
different literature focused more on the control of economic aspects (and in particular the costs of the activity) as 
performance indicators of the company's activity. At the international level, and in particular in the United States, 
the use of the incidence of overheads is an element of examination to assess the performance of the non-profit 
sector. In this article, the subject of analysis is the possibility of using the overhead level to assess the 
performance of a public body. The analysis is carried out by comparing the incidence of overheads on the 
revenues of Italian municipalities in the years 2015-2017 with the performance indicators given by the deficit 
parameters established by current administrative legislation. From this analysis, it is possible to identify the 
presence of a correlation between the performance indicators and the incidence of overheads, in which the 
likelihood of the presence of “good”, “excellent” or “excellent” indicators is given by levels of overhead in the 
region of 10% of the total revenue assessed, with a margin of tolerance of 3% in positive for smaller entities (up 
to 5,000 inhabitants), and 3% in negative for larger entities. 
Keywords: overhead, local public sector, performance indicators 
1. Introduction 
In the last two decades, the New Public Management wave has driven a shift in public sector accounting 
techniques to build the foundations of sustainable and inclusive societies (OECD 2015, 11). This renewal had 
tried to go in the same direction in all countries, and particularly in Europe, but with times and methods linked to 
the traditions of individual countries that have not always led to uniform results (Brusca et al., 2016).  
Many factors have affected and accelerated this mechanism. These include the request by stakeholders for 
transparency in the applied principles and purposes of public sector accounting, the economic crisis, and the 
development of IPSAS (International Public Sector Accounting Standards). 
In Italy, this process of harmonization of public sector accounting began in 2011 with applications starting in 
2013, becoming effective in 2018. This process aimed to make general government financial statements 
homogeneous, comparable, and available for aggregation and citizens' consideration. This is not only an 
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accounting reform (now mandatory for all), but a reform that must be integrated and spread within the 
organizational context of the organization, both through the diffusion of new management culture and through 
the adaptation of computerized management tools, but also through a new budget structure that must be 
integrated with the organizational structure of the organization itself (Anessi Pessina, 2018). 
Accounting is the mechanism by which the economy of organized life is elaborated and institutionalized; at a 
theoretical level the main roles of accounting are (Miller e Power 2013):  
• Territorializing (creation of an informed context that fulfills the training of awareness of the results of the 
management and the work of the organization);  
• Mediating (a role of external communication of the activities of the organization and of its results);  
• Adjudicating (the possibility of submitting activities to stakeholders for their opinion); 
• Subjectivizing (making the organization’s activities subject to control by the competent bodies). 
In light of this interpretative framework, this contribution is intended to verify whether overheads (intended as 
general and structure expenses ratio over total revenues or expenses) can be an immediate, easy, and sufficient 
indicator for measuring the level of efficiency of public administration spending. 
2. Non-Profit Performance: A Review of the Literature 
2.1 Non-Strategic Costs in the Non-Profit Sector 
If we consider business forms for the satisfaction of needs(Puddu et al., 2014), public companies are consumer 
companies that meet collective needs with the aim of income redistribution(Migliavacca, Rainero, & Puddu, 
2016). They differ from those of production in that they do not have direct access to the market, so the sources of 
financing are derived from taxes imposed by law, while the uses concern management costs, asset investments, 
and debt repayments (Migliavacca, Rainero, & Puddu, 2016). 
Keeping this interpretation key, another category belonging to consumer companies is that of nonprofit 
companies, which can be partially equated to public companies precisely because of the absence of a real 
reference market and the finding of sources of financing for carrying out the activity mainly from external 
contributions without consideration. The only difference is that such contributions cannot be imposed by law and 
are aimed at assisting and providing services and benefits to the community of reference, in the absence of profit 
and capital distribution (Bowman, Tuckman, & Young, 2012; Hansmann, 1996). 
If, therefore, in the public sector performance is mainly and historically linked to the management of financial 
resources and public debt (Pollitt, 2016), in the field of nonprofit there is different literature focused more on the 
control of economic aspects (and in particular the costs of the activity) as performance indicators of the 
company's activity. 
The efficiency of nonprofit means, in general, the ability of the organization to achieve its mission at the lowest 
possible cost (Ecer, Magro, & Sarpça, 2017). To assess the efficiency of these companies, one of the tools most 
used by donors, which represents the main source of funding (Duncan, 2004) is the incidence of so-called 
overheads. Overheads are non-strategic costs that, for the nonprofit sector, mainly consist of costs related to 
fundraising and salary costs (Portillo & Stinn, 2018). This choice is mainly dictated by the ease of finding this 
information and the simplicity of reading it (Glassman & Spahn, 2012).  
At the international level, and in particular, in the United States, the use of overheads is an element of evaluation 
for the rating provided by Charity Navigator (which is based on data collected through the IRS Form 990, 
submitted by American nonprofits to benefit from tax exemption) whose website, according to the CEO, is 
consulted every year by more than three million donors who turn to this "controller" to find out where to hijack 
their donations (Glassman & Spahn, 2012). It follows from these assessments that organizations with higher 
administrative expenses are the most penalized (Gneezy, Keenan, & Gneezy, 2014) it is proven that the more 
overheads increase, the more donations decrease with an inversely proportional ratio (Woods Bowman, 2006). 
This is determined by the fact that donors want their donations to be used primarily for the nonprofit company 
and not to cover other costs, particularly those of fundraising (Portillo & Stinn, 2018). 
While it is true that donors prefer organizations where overhead and non-strategic costs are absent, where it is 
possible to find them, the choice to donate often falls preferentially on those organizations that have to cover 
fundraising expenses rather than those that use donations to cover wage costs(Gneezy, Keenan, & Gneezy 2014).  
More recently, other studies claim that the donors most committed to the cause are also those who accept higher 
levels of overhead (Newman et al., 2019). 
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Surely the first problem to consider is how these overheads (non-strategic costs) are calculated. Already Cooper 
and Kaplan in the '80s and '90s of the other century had suggested the Activity-based costing method even if 
over the years it has been poorly used by companies due to its complexity and the need for people exclusively 
dedicated to data processing. An alternative solution with a more simplified method can be that of time-driven 
activity-based costing (Ringelstein, 2018). 
The methodology for calculating overheads must, however, take into account the fact that these organizations are 
not all the same. They are very different in terms of age, size and sub-sector(Hager, Pollak, & Rooney, 2001) and 
in terms of strength of structure (Hager, Pollak, & Rooney, 2004) For example, it is proven that for social 
enterprises, which have a greater dependence on commercial revenues, is associated with greater efficiency in 
the management of general and administrative expenses, but at the same time with lower efficiency in 
fundraising(Ecer, Magro, & Sarpça, 2017). 
Considering that reducing overheads harms organizations’ ability to launch fundraising campaigns, one solution 
is to find an initial donation to cover overheads. It is documented that this strategy increases donations by 80% 
(Gneezy, Keenan, & Gneezy, 2014). This way, subsequent donations become "free" and go directly to the cause. 
If this start-up fund is not sufficient to cover all overheads, it should be used primarily to cover salary expenses. 
This sensitivity of donors and their aversion to overheads must be taken seriously by managers of nonprofit 
organizations (Portillo & Stinn, 2018). 
Other studies suggest that there is a correlation between the level of overheads and changes in equity and that a 
balance needs to be struck between reducing overheads and investment to achieve positive growth (Huang, 
2014). 
In the United States, according to The Donor Mindset Study, the average donor considers 19 percent acceptable 
overhead, even though the average for nonprofit organizations is 28 percent (Nonprofit Business Advisor 2018). 
Therefore, for the American average, 20 percent overhead can be considered reasonable as a benchmark to 
consider an efficient organization (Portillo & Stinn, 2018). 
The problem with this approach, as reported in the recent literature, is that it is not adequate to measure the level 
of efficiency of nonprofit organizations because it does not directly assess the degree to which these 
organizations can transform inputs into outputs (Coupet & Berrett, 2019).  
To calculate the business performance of the non-profit sector, especially at an international level, since a greater 
amount of classified data is available and accessible to all (see for example form 990 and Charity Navigator), the 
overhead evaluation tool can be considered outdated or to be exceeded, as suggested by the recent literature, as it 
is possible through this data to make more in-depth evaluations through more specific indicators, from the public 
sector point of view this indicator, in our opinion, can still be considered adequate. 
2.2 Overhead and Public Companies 
As indicated above, the types of nonprofit and public sector companies are generally included in the so-called 
"supply companies", whose purpose is not the production and exchange on the market of a good or service with 
the purpose of capital accumulation, but rather the provision of services worthy of protection, pursuing a higher 
moral "cause". For this reason, capital accumulation takes second place and so does cost efficiency. Thus, just as 
in the nonprofit sector the cause is to favor disadvantaged population groups or transmit moral values through its 
activity, in the public sector the main cause is to protect the population over which it has authority and power to 
govern through policies of income redistribution and protection of rights. It follows that, while on the nonprofit 
sector side, revenues are provided by voluntary donors, who prefer non-strategic cost levels and overheads, on 
the public sector side, revenues are forcibly withdrawn from the population, which loses the possibility of 
evading the withdrawal of money if the non-strategic costs are too high (thus constituting a source of 
inefficiency of public spending). 
The first observation to make, therefore, is that what is defined as "non-strategic costs", or overheads for the 
nonprofit sector, in the public sector can be considered strategic. Non-strategic costs are costs linked to the 
purchase of factors not strictly related to business activity (non-productive factors). For the nonprofit sector, 
therefore, we consider as non-strategic costs the costs linked to "fundraising", limited to the costs for the 
acquisition of taxes and, subordinately, for tax controls, and personnel costs.  
On the public administration side, on the other hand, the cost of personnel is a strategic cost as it is the 
productive factor through which public companies provide the services and its reduction must be linked to 
processes of efficiency gains in which the level of expenditure must depend on issues of needs and skills.  
On the other hand, fundraising activity corresponds to the so-called "tax collection", i.e. the compulsory levy 
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through taxation, the efficiency of which is generally assumed based on the impact of general and administrative 
costs on the tax revenue collected. The more this ratio tends to fall (reduction in administrative costs or increase 
in tax revenue through greater compliance, thus reducing tax evasion), the more the level of efficiency increases 
(OECD 2015, 162). Considering that the increase in the denominator (tax revenues) is not of immediate increase 
according to the policies of the public company, and constitutes a medium-long term tendential policy (fight 
against evasion, reforms of the tax system, etc...), it is, therefore, necessary to reduce overheads to improve the 
efficiency of public administration. 
3. Research Question and Methodology 
3.1 Elements Underlying the Analysis 
Our analysis is based on a previous scientific contribution that carried out the analysis of overheads on almost all 
(Note 1) of the Italian municipalities (Rainero, 2019) and it emerged that, in the period 2013-2017, for medium 
and large municipalities (> 5,000 inhabitants), overheads reach a maximum of 20%, while for smaller ones (up 
to 5,000 inhabitants) they reach 27-28%.  
We focused on the Italian public sector only, not to introduce in the analysis elements of disturbance due to the 
country differences in this preliminary analysis. 
Our contribution questions the possibility of using overheads as a tool for an immediate and simple investigation 
of the efficiency of territorial public companies' spending. 
In particular, this research raises the following question: 
H. Is it possible to identify a level of overhead for which the likelihood of other positive performance indicators 
is maximized? 
To carry out this analysis, the level of overhead specific to each municipality is compared with other 
performance indicators used at the national level to assess the performance and solidity of the municipalities; 
specifically, the deficit parameters set out in the Ministerial Decree of 28 December 2018 (Note 2) (hereafter 
called MINDEC), which follows and reproduces "the Guideline [...] on the revision of the parameters for the 
identification of structurally deficient local authorities [...]". (Note 3). This document identifies 8 parameters 
(defined as "deficits") used to assess the performance of municipalities and performance compared with other 
local authorities. 
The analysis was conducted on all the Italian municipalities, equal to 7,983 existing in 2017 and surveyed by the 
AIDA-PA database of Bureau Van Dijk. 
It is precisely by comparing the specific overhead levels for each institution with the performance indicators that 
it is possible to determine whether there is an "optimal" level of overhead where it is more likely that the 
municipality is in a situation of balance and good performance. Therefore, based on the indicators proposed in 
the Guideline, a comparative analysis has been carried out between these indicators and the impact of overheads 
on total verified revenue.  
3.2 Municipalities' Deficit Indicators 
The Guideline identifies 8 indicators to assess equal deficit levels for municipalities, metropolitan cities, and 
provinces. In the Guideline, for each indicator, there are thresholds above (or below) which the Entity can be 
considered "positive" and, consequently, performing and not in deficit. These thresholds are determined based on 
the percentiles of the distribution of the values assumed by the indicators, as recorded in the MINDEC. In 
particular, the thresholds have been set at the ninth decile (88-90th percentile) for parameters considered positive 
if the threshold is exceeded, or at the first decile (10-12th percentile) for parameters considered positive if the 
threshold is not exceeded. These indicators and the respective thresholds are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Deficit parameters and thresholds for municipalities 
Parameter Parameter formula Positivity Threshold
P1 - Impact of strict expenditure on current revenue 
[Deficit provision for the financial year 
+ Commitments (Macro-aggregates 1.1 
'Compensation of employees' + Account 
N. 1.02.01.01.000 'IRAP'-PFV revenue 
relating to the Macro-aggregate 1.1 + 
FPV staff leaving 1.1 + 1.7 'Interest 
payable' + Title 4 Loan repayments)] 
/(First three securities Receipts) 
positive if < threshold 48% 
P2 - Effect of own revenue receipts on current final estimates
Total receipts on accrual and residual 
account (Account N. E.1.01.00.000 
"Taxes" - "Tax sharing" 
E.1.01.04.00.000 + E.3.00.00.000 "Extra 
revenue") / Final cash appropriations of 
the first three revenue titles 
positive if > threshold 22% 
P3 - Advance payment closed 
Cash advance at the beginning of the 
next financial year/maximum foreseen 
by the regulation 
positive if > threshold 0 
P4 - Sustainability financial debts: 
Commitments (Total 1.7 "Interest 
payable" - "Interest on arrears" 
(U.1.07.06.02.000) - "Interest on loan 
advances" (U.1.07.06.04.000) + Title IV 
of the expenditure - early repayment) - 
(Accruals Revenue category 
E.4.02.06.00.000 "Investment grants 
directly for the repayment of loans from 
general government") + Capital transfers 
for assumption of government debt by 
general government (E.4.03.01.00.000) 
+ Capital transfers by general 
government for cancellation of 
government debt (E.4.03.04.00.000)) / 
Findings on securities 1, 2 and 3 
positive if < threshold 16% 
P5 - Sustainability deficit borne by the year 
 
Deficit entered as expenditure in the 
balance sheet account / Assessments of 
Titles 1, 2 and 3 of Revenue 
positive if < threshold 1,2% 
P6 - Effect of off-balance-sheet debts financed on expenditure
Amount recognized and financed 
off-balance sheet liabilities / Total 
commitments Title 1 and Title 2 
positive if < threshold 1% 
P7 - off-balance-sheet debt as a percentage of revenue 
(Amount of off-balance-sheet payables 
in the course of recognition + Amount of 
off-balance-sheet payables recognized 
and in the course of financing) / Total 
revenue assessment for Titles 1, 2 and 3
positive if < threshold 0,60% 
P8 - Indicator of actual collection capacity 
% of total collection: (Accrual 
collections + residual collections) / 
(Accrual collections + initial final 
residues). 
positive if > threshold 47% 
Source: Ministerial decree 28 December 2018. 
 
For our analysis, it is necessary to recalculate these thresholds and also consider different distribution levels and 
percentiles. To consider thresholds corresponding to such extreme percentiles would lead to considering the vast 
majority of municipalities (about 90%) as inefficient, non-performing, or deficient. The provision of such high 
thresholds by the Law is dictated by the purpose of benchmarking and improvement, while for our analysis it is 
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necessary to establish different threshold levels (close to the median), to increase the sample of efficient 
municipalities. 
3.3 Data Collection 
For the calculation of the deficit parameters (hereinafter also referred to as 'indicators'), the variables in Table 2 
have been extracted using the AIDA-PA database managed by Bureau Van Dijk. 
 
Table 2. Variables extracted 
ID Necessary variables Situation of the extraction 
1 Population Extracted data 
2 Deficit indicators Extracted data 
3 Title 1 Revenue - Established Extracted data 
4 Title 2 Revenue - Established Extracted data 
5 Title 3 Revenue - Established Extracted data 
6 Total receipts E.1.01.00.000 - Competence and residue Extracted data 
7 Total collections E.1.01.04.00.000 - Competence and residue Extracted data 
8 E.3.00.00.000 - Non-recovered revenue Extracted data 
9 Title 1 Revenue - Final cash appropriations 
Not present in the 
database - variable #3 is 
similar in size and 
magnitude 
10 Title 2 Revenue - Final cash appropriations 
Not in the database - 
variable #4 is of a 
similar amount 
11 Title 3 Revenue - Final cash payments 
Not in the database - 
variable #5 is of a 
similar amount 
12 Revenue E.4.02.06.00.000 - Findings  Extracted data 
13 c/a for the assumption of debts from other AA.PP. E.4.03.01.00.000 - Transfers Extracted data 
14 current accounts for debt cancellation E.4.03.04.00.000 - Transfers Extracted data 
15 c/competence - Rewards Extracted data 
16 w/residences - redeeming Extracted data 
17 Overall findings Extracted data 
18 Final initial residues Extracted data 
19 Macro-aggregated commitments 1.1 - Employee income Extracted data 
20 Commitments 1.02.01.01.000 - "IRAP Extracted data 
21 FPV - Macroaggregate 1.1 Not in the database 
22 FPV output personnel -Macroaggregate 1.1 Not in the database 
23 1.7 "Interest expense Extracted data 
24 Title 4 - Loan Repayment Extracted data 
25 Commitments 1.7 - Interest on arrears (U.1.07.06.02.000) 
Not present in the 
database at this level of 
detail 
26 Commitments 1.7 - Interest on loan advances (U.1.07.06.04.000) 
Not present in the 
database at this level of 
detail 
27 Title 4 Expenditure on early termination Extracted data 
28 Title 1 - Commitments Expenditure  Extracted data 
29 Title 2 - Commitments Expenditure  Extracted data 
30 Deficit entered as expenditure in the balance sheet account Not in the database 
31 Deficit recovery for the year Not in the database 
32 Amount of off-balance-sheet payables recognized and financed Extracted data 
33 Amount of off-balance-sheet payables in the process of being recognized Not in the database 
34 Amount of off-balance-sheet payables recognized in the course of financing Not in the database 
35 MISSION 1 Commitments Extracted data 
36 Treasury advances at the beginning of the following year Extracted data 
Source: AIDA-PA by Bureau Van Dijk. 
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The following indicators can be calculated from the data extracted (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Calculated indicators 
Indicator Formula (variable ID) * 
P1 31**+19+20-21**+22**+23+24
3+4+5  
P2 6-7+8
3+4+5 
P4 25**-26**+24-(12+13+14)
3+4+5  
P8 15+16
17+18 
Notes. *The numbers in this column refer to the "ID" column in Table 2 or 3. 
** The figure is missing, therefore it is not taken into account in the calculation of the indicator. 
It was not possible to reconstruct indicators P3, P5, P6, and P7 because insufficient data could be found to allow a relevant analysis based on 
them. 
Source: formulas in the Addressing Document and reworked according to the variable numbers indicated in Table 2 or 3. 
 
Concerning the data missing in the other indicators, however, having to recalculate the value of the indicator, the 
difference in values does not appear significant, also because these values are absent for all the Institutions 
considered. Therefore, these deficiencies are not to be considered relevant for the analysis in progress. 
3.4 The Calculation of Overheads and the "Clustering" of the Population of Municipalities 
Overheads were determined using the Mission and Programme Expense Classification approach(Rainero 2019). 
The basis of the analysis is the expenses contained in Mission 1 called Expenditure for "Institutional, General 
and Management Services" which considers the following strategic functions and objectives: 
• Administration and operation of general services, statistical and information services, activities for the 
development of the entity from a governance and partnership perspective and institutional communication, 
• Administration, operation, and support to executive and legislative bodies, 
• Administration and operation of economic planning services in general and activities for business and 
financial and tax services, 
• Development and management of personnel policies, 
• Interventions within the framework of a single regional policy of a general nature and technical assistance. 
Mission 1 is, in turn, made up of 11 programs: 
• Program 01: Institutional bodies 
• Program 02: General Secretariat 
• Program 03: Economic management, financial management, programming, provisioning 
• Program 04: Tax revenue management and tax services 
• Program 05: Management of state property and assets 
• Program 06: Technical Office 
• Program 07: Popular elections and consultations - Civil registry and marital status  
• Program 08: Statistics and information systems 
• Program 09: Technical-administrative assistance to local authorities 
• Program 10: Human Resources 
• Program 11: Other general services(Rainero 2019) 
For our analysis, we have considered as overheads the expenses contained in Programmes 01, 02, 03, 08, 10, and 
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11. Therefore, Programmes 04, 05, 06, and 07 have been discarded as they refer to expenses incurred by 
municipalities to produce specific services (Rainero 2019).  
To constitute an element of analysis, these expenses must be weighted and considered concerning the size of the 
institution. The benchmark used for the weighting is total verified revenue. Therefore, the percentage of 
overhead has been calculated as follows. 
Overhead (%)= Expenses obligationsEstablished Revenues 
To perform the comparative analysis between overhead levels and indicator values, assuming continuous values, 
it is necessary to divide the variables into clusters based on the distribution of the values of the variables 
themselves. 
The table below shows the clusters related to the percentage incidence of overheads calculated according to the 
previous formula. 
In particular, clusters have been identified based on distribution percentiles, thus identifying 10% with the lowest 
values, 10% with the highest values, and four intermediate levels (which enclose 20% of municipalities each). 
The following table (Table 4) shows the overhead values assumed by the municipalities included in the clusters. 
 
Table 4. Reference percentages for the calculation of thresholds (overhead incidence) 
Cluster (overhead incidence) Percentages of distribution considered Overhead values included in the cluster 
Level 1 From 0 to 10 percentile (0-7%] 
Level 2 10° to 30° percentile (7-10%] 
Level 3 30° to 50° percentile (10-13%] 
Level 4 50° to 70° percentile (13-16%] 
Level 5 70° to 90° percentile (16-24%] 
Level 6 From 90° to 100° percentile (greater than 24%) 
 
The clusters for each indicator (deficit parameters) were also determined in the same way. The value of the limits 
(upper or lower) of each cluster is shown in the table below, indicating the reference percentile. The values are 
shown in Table 5a and 5b refer to the values of the deficit parameters, determined as the results of the calculation 
of the parameter according to the methods explained in Table 3 in paragraph 3.2. above, taken from the quanta of 
the distribution indicated, in each reference year. 
 
Table 5a. Reference percentages for the calculation of thresholds (indicators P1 and P4) 
Cluster Percentages considered Year 
P1 - Cluster upper limit 
value 
P4 - Cluster upper limit 
value 
0 - Very bad From 0 to 10 percentile 
2015 max max 
2016 max  max  
2017 max max 
1 - Insufficient 10° to 30° percentile
2015 15,65% 10,02% 
2016 16,35% 10,28% 
2017 39,03% 16,80% 
2 - Sufficient 30° to 50° percentile
2015 10,69% 6,43% 
2016 11,29% 6,66% 
2017 10,19% 7,62% 
3 - Good 50° to 70° percentile
2015 7,57% 4,37% 
2016 8,22% 4,65% 
2017 6,05% 3,96% 
4 - Very good 70° to 90° percentile
2015 4,67% 2,63% 
2016 5,40% 2,98% 
2017 3,92% 2,45% 
5 - Excellent 
From 90° percentile 
to max 
2015 0,19% 0,01% 
2016 1,60% 0,43% 
2017 1,78% 1,07% 
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Table 5b. Reference percentages for the calculation of thresholds (indicators P2 and P8) 
Cluster Percentages considered Year 
P2 - Cluster lower limit 
value 
P8 - Cluster lower limit 
value 
0 - Very bad From max to 90° percentile 
2015 0 0 
2016 0 0 
2017 0 0 
1 - Insufficient From 90° to 70° percentile 
2015 29,287% 35,111% 
2016 40,542% 42,977% 
2017 22,803% 36,432% 
2 - Sufficient 70° to 50° percentile
2015 67,243% 58,353% 
2016 71,317% 61,353% 
2017 36,450% 53,487% 
3 - Good 50° to 30° percentile
2015 80,380% 67,838% 
2016 85,024% 70,372% 
2017 42,301% 63,667% 
4 - Very good 30° to 10° percentile
2015 87,603% 74,679% 
2016 92,006% 77,372% 
2017 45,836% 72,276% 
5 - Excellent From 10 to 0 percentile 
2015 94,741% 82,720% 
2016 99,460% 85,292% 
2017 50,365% 81,903% 
 
The values of the thresholds determined are consistent with the parameters dictated by the ministerial decree of 
reference. In particular, the threshold value determined by the legislator has values substantially comparable to 
the values determined through recalculation and, in particular, equal to 39% for indicator P1 (MINDEC= 48%), 
22.80% for indicator P2 (MINDEC= 22%), 16.80% for indicator P4 (MINDEC= 16%) and 36% for indicator P8 
(MINDEC= 47%). The minor differences are due to the lack of existing data on some variables (in particular for 
indicator P1) or on some of the individuals in the sample observed (in particular for indicator P8). 
4. Data Analysis and Discussion 
4.1 Correlation between Variables 
The first analysis that is carried out is purely descriptive and allows an overall analysis of the presence of a 
correlation between ministerial performance indicators and the level of the overhead of the municipalities. 
As can be seen in Table 6, indicators P1 and P4 are negatively correlated with the level of overhead (calculated 
as the impact of overheads on revenue). This behavior, although the correlation is not particularly strong, shows 
a trend of direct correlation. This is consistent with the purpose of the indicators, which see an improvement of 
the indicator as it decreases. From this, it can be inferred that lower levels of overheads are expected when the 
performance of the institution improves, in line with what has already been specified in the existing literature. 
Similarly, the P2 and P8 indicators are inversely correlated with the level of overhead. Similarly to the other 
indicators, the correlation is not particularly strong but shows an inversely proportional trend. This can be 
interpreted as worsening performance (as the indicators are better if they are high) as the level of revenue 
overhead increases. 
For municipalities with a population of 5,000 inhabitants or less (small municipalities) this correlation is more 
evident, also due to the lower collection capacity, the size of the population living in the municipality, and the 
resulting lower spending capacity. The greatest correlation is expressed for indicators P8 (Indicator of collection 
capacity) and P1 (Indicator of incidence of rigid expenditure), followed by indicator P2 (Incidence of receipts on 
forecasts). By contrast, the indicator P4 (Sustainability of financial debts) shows a lower correlation. 
For municipalities with a population of more than 5,000 inhabitants, on the other hand, the greatest correlation is 
given by indicators P1 and P4, while indicators P2 and P8 show a less significant correlation. 
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Table 6. Analysis of the correlation between variables 
Indicator 
Correlation index () 
Entire population Sample up to 5,000 inhabitants 
Sample over 5,000 
inhabitants 
P1 0,1405 0,1584 0,1888 
P2 -0,0950 -0,1227 -0,0619 
P4 0,0954 0,0889 0,1790 
P8 -0,1577 -0,1771 -0,0524 
Source: our processing. 
 
From these correlation ratios, it can be argued that there is a correlation between the level of impact of overheads 
on revenues and the performance of the institution. It may also be argued that this correlation does not fully 
explain the performance of the institution, but is nevertheless a broad indicator that may, other things being equal, 
allow the economic performance of a public sector entity to be determined. 
In the following paragraphs, we, therefore, try to determine an optimal overhead level by comparing the 
indicators with the incidence of overheads according to the (conditional) clusters defined above. 
4.2 Determination of the Optimal Overhead Level - Comparison of Overhead Levels with the Rigid Expense 
Incidence Indicator 
Indicator P1 determines the level of impact of 'hard expenditure' on total Revenue. This indicator has a trend 
inversely proportional to the performance of the institution and is considered better as the value of the indicator 
decreases. For this reason, as explained above, it shows a trend directly related to the impact of overheads on 
revenue, for which the greater the containment, the better the performance of the institution examined is 
considered. From Table 7 it is possible to analyze the absolute and relative distribution of entities within the 
crossed clusters. All tables show the distribution of municipalities without taking the reference year into account. 
The research results explained in the table suggest that the lower the percentage of overheads, the better the 
indicator is likely to perform. In particular, for a level between zero and 7% of expenditure most municipalities 
(with a ratio of 1 to 2) show indicators with a level at least equal to "Good" (above the median), with a 
preponderance of indicators equal to "Excellent" or "Excellent" (above the 70th percentile). The more the 
percentage incidence of overheads increases, the more this ratio is reduced until it is reversed for overheads 
above 10%, with good results however up to 16%.  
The same analysis was also carried out by dividing the sample among municipalities with a population of less 
than 5,000 and more than 5,000 inhabitants. Let's consider the data referred to as the first sample: municipalities 
with a population of 5,000 inhabitants or less. This analysis shows how a low overhead value expresses values of 
the indicator closer to the "best" clusters, where the difference between the relative weights of the distribution 
remains high for overhead levels equal to or lower than 13%, beyond which the difference between positive and 
negative indicators tends to assume a uniform distribution.  
The analysis of the sample of municipalities with a population of over 5,000 inhabitants suggests even lower 
values, about 7%. In fact, for overhead values above 7%, the proportion between municipalities with 
performance indicators at least above the median and municipalities with indicator values below the median 
flattens out to tend to reverse.  
From the analysis of the indicator, both at the population level and the level of samples based on the size of 
municipalities, it is, therefore, possible to define an optimal overhead threshold around 10%, inversely 
proportional to the size of the municipality. In other words, from the analysis of the indicator, it is possible to 
define as most likely to perform municipalities with levels of general expenditure (overhead) that do not affect 
more than 10% of total revenue, with a margin of tolerance of 3% in positive for smaller municipalities and in 
negative for larger municipalities. 
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Table 7. Overhead ratio clusters conditioned to P1 deficit parameter clusters for population distribution and 
population-based samples 
P1 
Total number of municipalities Municipalities with a population of 5,000 inhabitants or less Municipalities with a population of more than 5,000 inhabitants 
0-7% 7-10% 10-13% 13-16% 16-24% >24% Total 0-7% 7-10% 10-13% 13-16% 16-24% >24% Total 0-7% 7-10% 10-13% 13-16% 16-24% >24% Total 
Ab
sol
ute
 va
lue
s 
0 - Very bad 60 162 254 214 201 94 985 41 51 96 107 131 78 504 19 111 158 107 70 16 481 
1 - Insufficient 331 800 1216 1000 1063 484 4.894 193 347 603 642 854 449 3.088 138 453 613 358 209 35 1.806 
2 - Sufficient 371 771 1096 909 1205 537 4.889 202 378 600 646 1015 511 3.352 169 393 496 263 190 26 1.537 
3 - Good 412 790 1037 905 1206 543 4.893 240 450 667 657 1045 517 3.576 172 340 370 248 161 26 1.317 
4 - Very good 576 983 1020 835 968 511 4.893 333 616 717 648 850 502 3.666 243 367 303 187 118 9 1.227 
5 - Excellent 518 534 459 325 427 184 2.447 351 375 341 266 390 181 1.904 167 159 118 59 37 3 543 
Total 2.268 4.040 5.082 4.188 5.070 2.353 23.001 1.360 2.217 3.024 2.966 4.285 2.238 16.090 908 1.823 2.058 1.222 785 115 6.911 
Re
lat
ive
 gr
ou
pe
d v
alu
es 
0 - Very bad 
3,3% 7,5% 11,2% 9,2% 10,7% 4,9% 46,8% 2,7% 4,8% 8,1% 8,7% 12,4% 6,4% 43,1% 4,7% 13,9% 18,3% 10,5% 6,8% 1,1% 55,3%1 - Insufficient 
2 - Sufficient 
3 - Good 
6,6% 10% 10,9% 9% 11,3% 5,4% 53,2% 5,7% 9% 10,7% 9,8% 14,2% 7,5% 56,9% 8,4% 12,5% 11,5% 7,2% 4,6% 0,6% 44,7%4 - Very good 
5 - Excellent 
Total 9,9% 17,5% 22,1% 18,2% 22% 10,3% 100% 8,4% 13,8% 18,8% 18,5% 26,6% 13,9% 100% 13,1% 26,4% 29,8% 17,7% 11,4% 1,7% 100% 
 
4.3 Determination of the Optimal Overhead Level - Comparison of Overhead Levels with the Indicator of the 
Impact of Own Revenue Receipts on Current Final Forecasts 
Table 8 refers to the second indicator (P2) which, as already mentioned above, considers the impact of own 
revenue receipts on the current final forecast. When the indicator is higher, the municipality is considered to 
perform better. The correlation analysis shows that the indicator has an inversely proportional correlation with 
the level of overhead and, therefore, the lower and the incidence of this item, the better the performance levels 
should be. 
From the analysis of the data at an overall level (Table 9), it can be seen that the distribution of the municipalities 
assumes values of the indicator mainly "good" with levels of overhead below 13%, above which the majority of 
municipalities show results of the indicator below the median of the distribution. All tables show the distribution 
of municipalities without taking the reference year into account. 
The best results, in any case, as for the previous indicator, are shown by municipalities with an incidence of 
overheads of 10% or less. 
Also at sample level, the analysis shows similar results, with small municipalities showing a "good" trend in the 
indicator results for overhead levels up to 13% and larger municipalities showing a positive situation for levels 
below 10% and even better for levels below 7%. 
From the analysis of the indicator, both at the population level and the level of samples based on the size of the 
municipalities, it is, therefore, possible to define an optimal overhead threshold of around 13%, with a margin of 
tolerance of 3% in positive for smaller municipalities and in negative for larger municipalities. 
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Table 8. Clusters of overhead ratio conditioned to P2 deficit parameter clusters for population distribution and 
population-based samples 
P2 
Total number of municipalities Municipalities with a population of 5,000 inhabitants or less Municipalities with a population of more than 5,000 inhabitants 
0-7% 7-10% 10-13% 13-16% 16-24% >24% Total 0-7% 7-10% 10-13% 13-16% 16-24% >24% Total 0-7% 7-10% 10-13% 13-16% 16-24% >24% Total 
Ab
sol
ute
 va
lue
s 
0 - Very bad 130 314 471 480 694 359 2.448 105 213 314 353 613 348 1.946 25 101 157 127 81 11 502 
1 - Insufficient 160 429 779 691 845 358 3.262 89 225 412 457 715 344 2.242 71 204 367 234 130 14 1.020 
2 - Sufficient 333 842 1.194 960 1.065 496 4.890 160 393 581 608 861 473 3.076 173 449 613 352 204 23 1.814 
3 - Good 691 1.049 956 758 946 492 4.892 364 554 542 524 795 472 3.251 327 495 414 234 151 20 1.641 
4 - Very good 688 1.008 1.067 765 919 446 4.893 441 562 721 588 770 411 3.493 247 446 346 177 149 35 1.400 
5 - Excellent 278 436 688 604 687 267 2.960 212 288 478 488 599 252 2.317 66 148 210 116 88 15 643 
Total 2.280 4.078 5.155 4.258 5.156 2.418 23.345 1.371 2.235 3.048 3.018 4.353 2.300 16.325 909 1.843 2.107 1.240 803 118 7.020 
Re
lat
ive
 gr
ou
pe
d v
alu
es 
0 - Very bad 
2,7% 6,8% 10,5% 9,1% 11,1% 5,2% 45,4% 2,2% 5,1% 8 % 8,7% 13,4% 7,1% 44,5% 3,8% 10,7% 16,2% 10,2% 5,9% 0,7% 47,5% 1 - Insufficient 
2 - Sufficient 
3 - Good 
7,1% 10,7% 11,6% 9,1% 10,9% 5,2% 54,6% 6,2% 8,6% 10,7% 9,8% 13,3% 6,9% 55,5% 9,1% 15,5% 13,8% 7,5% 5,5% 1% 52,5% 4 - Very good 
5 - Excellent 
Total 9,8% 17,5% 22,1% 18,2% 22,1% 10,4% 100% 8,4% 13,7% 18,7% 18,5% 26,7% 15% 100% 12,9% 26,2% 30,0% 17,7% 11,4% 1,7% 100% 
 
4.4 Determination of the Optimal Overhead Level - Comparison of Overhead Levels with the Financial Debt 
Sustainability Indicator 
Table 10 refers to the third indicator (P4) which takes into account the sustainability of financial debts. The 
preliminary analysis showed that this indicator was more correlated with overheads in larger municipalities, 
while the correlation in small municipalities is of little relevance. This indicator shows a trend directly 
proportional to performance, so the higher it is, the less performing the municipality. 
From the analysis of the data at an overall level (Table 9), it can be seen that the distribution of the municipalities 
assumes values of the indicator mainly "good" with all levels of overhead, with the best results, in any case, 
shown by municipalities with an incidence of the overhead of 10% or less. All tables show the distribution of 
municipalities without taking into account the reference year. 
In small municipalities, as could already be inferred from the correlation analysis, there seems to be no particular 
influence on the incidence of overheads compared to the performance indicator linked to the sustainability of 
financial debts. In larger municipalities, on the other hand, for overhead levels below 7%, there is a large 
preponderance of municipalities with "good" indicator levels (in particular, "excellent" level), while for higher 
levels there is an increasing preponderance of indicators below the median. 
From the analysis of the indicator, both at the population level and the level of samples based on the size of 
municipalities, it is, therefore, possible to define an optimal overhead threshold of around 10%, particularly for 
large municipalities, for which the incidence must be less than 7%. 
4.5 Determination of the Optimal Overhead Level - Comparison of Overhead Levels with the Actual Collection 
Capacity Indicator 
Considering the fourth indicator (P8), which refers to the actual collection capacity, it shows an inverse 
correlation with the level of overhead and, therefore, the higher the incidence of this item, the better the 
performance levels should assume. 
From the analysis of the distribution of municipalities in the various clusters (Table 10), the data suggest that 
overhead levels should not exceed 10% because above this level municipalities tend to be in the worst clusters of 
the indicator. All tables show the distribution of municipalities without taking the reference year into account. 
In particular, from the analysis of samples of small and large municipalities, the analysis on the P8 indicator 
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shows that the threshold value is 10% without particular differences and tolerance thresholds. 
 
Table 9. Overhead ratio clusters conditioned to P4 deficit parameter clusters for population distribution and 
population-based samples 
P4 
Total number of municipalities Municipalities with a population of 5,000 inhabitants or less Municipalities with a population of more than 5,000 inhabitants 
0-7% 7-10% 10-13% 13-16% 16-24% >24% Total 0-7% 7-10% 10-13% 13-16% 16-24% >24% Total 0-7% 7-10% 10-13% 13-16% 16-24% >24% Total 
Ab
sol
ute
 va
lue
s 
0 - Very bad 65 157 209 187 174 58 850 44 58 74 101 114 44 435 21 99 135 86 60 14 415 
1 - Insufficient 343 774 1.149 913 981 454 4.614 201 359 598 581 784 418 2.941 142 415 551 332 197 36 1.673 
2 - Sufficient 373 798 1.077 938 1.190 513 4.889 209 400 610 674 998 494 3.385 164 398 467 264 192 19 1.504 
3 - Good 413 783 1.053 927 1.162 556 4.894 259 437 647 686 1.003 531 3.563 154 346 406 241 159 25 1.331 
4 - Very good 538 940 1.038 813 1.026 537 4.892 291 562 702 612 896 521 3.584 247 378 336 201 130 16 1.308 
5 - Excellent 479 505 469 352 458 185 2.448 313 341 322 268 416 184 1.844 166 164 147 84 42 1 604 
Total 2.211 3.957 4.995 4.130 4.991 2.303 22.587 1.317 2.157 2.953 2.922 4.211 2.192 15.752 894 1.800 2.042 1.208 780 111 6.835 
Re
lat
ive
 gr
ou
pe
d v
alu
es 
0 - Very bad 
3,5% 7,6% 10,8% 9% 10,4% 4,5% 45,8% 2,9% 5,2% 8,1% 8,6% 12% 6,1% 42,9% 4,8% 13,3% 16,9% 10% 6,6% 1% 52,6% 1 - Insufficient 
2 - Sufficient 
3 - Good 
6,3% 9,9% 11,3% 9,3% 11,7% 5,7% 54,2% 5,5% 8,5% 10,6% 9,9% 14,7% 7,8% 57,1% 8,3% 13% 13% 7,7% 4,8% 0,6% 47,4% 4 - Very good 
5 - Excellent 
Total 9,8% 17,5% 22,1% 18,3% 22,1% 10,2% 100% 8,4% 13,7% 18,7% 18,5% 26,7% 13,9% 100% 13,1% 26,3% 29,9% 17,7% 11,4% 1,6% 100% 
 
Table 10. Clusters of overhead ratio conditioned to P8 deficit parameter clusters for population distribution and 
population-based samples 
P8 
Total number of municipalities Municipalities with a population of 5,000 inhabitants or less Municipalities with a population of more than 5,000 inhabitants 
0-7% 7-10% 10-13% 13-16% 16-24% >24% Total 0-7% 7-10% 10-13% 13-16% 16-24% >24% Total 0-7% 7-10% 10-13% 13-16% 16-24% >24% Total 
Ab
sol
ute
 va
lue
s 
0 - Very bad 109 215 438 490 779 417 2.448 81 150 303 382 683 409 2.008 28 65 135 108 96 8 440 
1 - Insufficient 304 686 1.095 986 1.233 589 4.893 176 376 657 673 1.062 569 3.513 128 310 438 313 171 20 1.380 
2 - Sufficient 466 858 1.138 903 1.035 491 4.891 244 432 594 604 864 469 3.207 222 426 544 299 171 22 1.684 
3 - Good 537 1.016 1.130 878 898 433 4.892 285 527 648 638 769 403 3.270 252 489 482 240 129 30 1.622 
4 - Very good 636 1.024 1.087 802 954 390 4.893 394 554 659 582 783 360 3.332 242 470 428 220 171 30 1.561 
5 - Excellent 208 263 257 191 249 96 1.264 171 186 181 132 188 88 946 37 77 76 59 61 8 318 
Total 2.260 4.062 5.145 4.250 5.148 2.416 23.281 1.351 2.225 3.042 3.011 4.349 2.298 16.276 909 1.837 2.103 1.239 799 118 7.005 
Re
lat
ive
 gr
ou
pe
d v
alu
es 
0 - Very bad 
3,8% 7,6% 11,5% 10,2% 13,1% 6,4% 52,5% 3,1% 5,9% 9,6% 10,2% 16% 8,9% 53,6% 5,4% 11,4% 16% 10,3% 6,3% 0,7% 50% 1 - Insufficient 
2 - Sufficient 
3 - Good 
5,9% 9,9% 10,6% 8% 9% 4% 47,5% 5,2% 7,8% 9,1% 8,3% 10,7% 5,2% 46,4% 7,6% 14,8% 14% 7,4% 5,11% 1% 50% 4 - Very good 
5 - Excellent 
Total 9,7% 17,5% 22,1% 18,2% 22,1% 10,4% 100% 8,3% 13,7% 18,7% 18,5% 26,7% 14,1% 100% 13% 26,2% 30% 17,7% 11,4% 1,7% 100% 
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5. Conclusions and Future Developments 
The analysis carried out shows that the level of overhead shows a correlation, although not particularly 
significant, with other performance indicators used to assess the performance of municipalities. In particular, this 
correlation is because the other indicators primarily consider data of a financial nature, originating from the 
financial accounts of the entities, while the overheads themselves should be calculated starting from the results 
of the economic-equity accounts, which is closely linked to the financial accounts employing the transposition 
matrix of the Plan of Accounts but which includes further considerations in terms of accrual and evaluation of 
the result for the year. 
From the study of the distribution of the municipalities in the various clusters (levels) of the indicator 
conditioned to the clusters (levels) of the incidence of overheads on the income of the entity, both at the 
population level and at the level of samples based on the size of the municipalities, it is, therefore, possible to 
define an optimal overhead threshold around 10%, inversely proportional to the size of the municipality.  
In particular, as demonstrated in the previous paragraph, an analysis of the indicators shows that municipalities 
are most likely to perform well in cases where levels of general expenditure (overhead) do not account for more 
than 10% of total revenue, with a margin of tolerance of 3% in positive for smaller municipalities and 3% in 
negative for larger municipalities. 
This research is limited by the fact that it is a preliminary, albeit in-depth, analysis, mainly aimed at verifying the 
existence of a correlation between certain levels of overhead and other indicators of efficiency of public 
enterprises. Moreover, it has not been possible to calculate some indicators due to lack of data and the analysis 
could be flawed in this sense, although it maintains intrinsic robustness due to the application of the same 
calculation to the whole universe of Italian municipalities. 
Future research developments will focus on investigating the underlying reasons for the correlations identified, 
to determine whether there is a causal relationship in reducing overall spending levels and improving the 
institution's performance with a time development approach and analysis of a historical series, as well as 
determining other disruptive factors and their weight in assessing the institution's performance. 
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Notes 
Note 1. About 90%, as 10% was discarded due to lack or incompleteness of data. 
Note 2. Decree of the Minister of the Interior in agreement with the Minister of Economy and Finance for the 
identification of structural deficit parameters for local authorities for the three-year period 2019-2021 (art. 242 of 
Local Public Sector Law, Legislative Decree 267/2000 (TUEL)). 
Note 3. Guidance document according to Article 154, paragraph 2, of the Consolidated Law on Local Authorities, 
approved by Legislative Decree No. 267 of 18 August 2000. 
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